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ABSTRACT
In agricultural policy and programmes, cooperatives have been framed as
organizational ﬁx for addressing institutional voids and market imperfections in rural
Africa. By way of guaranteeing scale, quality of produce, and professionalism,
cooperatives are assumed to be capable to subvert current trading patterns and
contribute to sustainable market access for small-scale farmers. However, such
change logic does not hold up well with the circumstances of African farmers and
traders. We argue that for understanding how a cooperative organizes sustainable
market linkages, attention should be paid to its capacity to navigate within its speciﬁc
context. This article traces the emergence and development of two cooperatives in
distinct contexts, Uganda and Mali. We use a critical institutionalist approach, called
bricolage, to show how in both cases farmers organize sustainable market access by
blending novel arrangements with existing institutions embedded in social and
economic relations. We suggest agricultural policy and programmes to shift attention
to the ability of a cooperative to embed new institutions in socio-historical shaped







Agricultural sustainability depends on more than
farming; it is as important for farmers to have a sustain-
able market outlet. In many rural areas in Sub-Saharan
Africa this is not self-evident. African markets are por-
trayed as being pervasively imperfect (Markelova,
Meinzen-Dick, Hellin, & Dohrn, 2009; Shiferaw, Hellin,
& Muricho, 2011). Poor infrastructure, weak institutions,
policy failures and high transaction costs among other
things, are thought to limit the poor from grasping the
opportunities oﬀered by a growing domestic demand
for food crops and a rapidly globalizing agricultural
economy (Barrett, 2008; Dorward et al., 2005;
Dorward, Kydd, Morrison, & Poulton, 2005; Kydd &
Dorward, 2004; Shiferaw et al., 2011).
In the last two decades, cooperatives have become
the centrepiece of pro-poor market development
interventions in Africa. Cooperatives are presented
as a solution to assumed institutional voids and
market imperfections that constrain farmers from
grasping economic opportunities (Devaux et al.,
2009; Fischer & Qaim, 2012; Lemeilleur & Codron,
2011; Markelova et al., 2009; IFPRI, 2014; Poole & de
Frece, 2010; Shiferaw et al., 2011; Trebbin, 2014).
They are regarded as being capable of changing pre-
vailing trade patterns by ﬁxing what is supposed to be
lacking in rural markets: scale, quality of produce and
professionalism (Devaux et al., 2009; Kaganzi et al.,
2009; Markelova et al., 2009).
However, how cooperatives foster market relations
remains unclear. Research concerning the contri-
bution of cooperatives in ‘ﬁxing’ market failures for
farmers focuses mostly on the impact of cooperative
membership at the level of the individual farmer. A
wide range of topics is covered such as the eﬀect on
farmers income, bargaining power, costs of marketing,
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access to market information, credit, inputs and exten-
sion services (Abate, Borzaga, & Getnet, 2014; Ahmed
& Mesﬁn, 2017; Bernard & Spielman, 2009; Fischer and
Qaim, 2012; Francesconi & Ruben, 2012).
Much of the empirical research on cooperatives
focus on the ‘design principles’ that should guarantee
beneﬁcial outcomes for all members (Donovan, Blare,
& Poole, 2017; Hagedorn, 2014). To exemplify, the fol-
lowing factors have been found conducive to
cooperation: group size and homogeneity of member-
ship; accountable leadership; trust among group
members; economic feasibility; ‘facilitators’; and the
type of crop and market.1
According to us these factors are not fully indica-
tive of how a cooperative successfully organizes
market access for its members. A focus on either the
design or the impact of a cooperative at farmer level
does not give us enough insight in how a cooperative
achieves collective outcomes and how it remains a
viable organization within a given context.
In Mali and Uganda, we observed a discrepancy
between the organizational models promoted in
development interventions and the diversity in prac-
tice of two well-functioning organizations. This to us
highlights that many assumptions on how a coopera-
tive should function do not correspond to what works
in practice.
In view of the strong role given to farmer organiz-
ations in development programmes aimed at improv-
ing market access we believe that it is important to
understand how cooperatives become organizations
viable to cater to sustainable market relations. It is this
research gap that we aim to address in this paper. Our
study questions the idea underlyingmany policy initiat-
ives that encourage the set-up of cooperatives; namely
that to realize market access for smallholders, new
formal institutions need to be designed. Instead, we
seek to understand how a cooperative is built on
already present market institutions, and how the
speciﬁc socio-historically context shapes collaboration
within the cooperative.
Accordingly, contrary to most of the research on
cooperatives, we shift perspective from the eﬀects of
cooperative membership, to understanding how
cooperatives organize sustainable market linkages,
and as such contribute to agricultural sustainability.
With this focus, we add to a small, diverse, and
growing body within development literature that
lays emphasis on the processes that reinforce organiz-
ations, rather than outcomes (for instance Wertheim-
Heck & Spaargaren, 2016; Sidibé et al., 2014;
Mangnus & Vellema, 2019). We do so by studying
the development and functioning of two African
cooperatives in distinct contexts, Uganda and Mali.
To scrutinize an organization ‘in development’ we
deem the approach of institutional bricolage as suit-
able. Institutional bricolage pays speciﬁc attention to
how organizations adapt to, and develop within, a
speciﬁc context (Cleaver, 2001). To our knowledge,
institutional bricolage has not been used for studying
the development and functioning of cooperatives in a
rural African setting. In our study, we scrutinize the
emergence, development and functioning of two
cooperatives in Uganda and Mali.
The two case studies show that for cooperatives to
achieve their objective, they need to be able to strate-
gically navigate in their speciﬁc context. With this
paper, we therefore recommend development policy
and practice to shift attention from fostering ideal-
type organizations to identifying and strengthening
capacities needed to perform within a speciﬁc
context. The following section – Theoretical Frame-
work - positions the theoretical perspective underlying
our study. This is followed by theMethodology section,
where we operationalize the bricolage approach and
describe our case study material. The case studies are
detailed in the section Findings. In the Analysis and
Discussion section, we answer the research question
and describe the implications of our ﬁndings for devel-
opment policy and practice. We conclude the paper
with a reﬂection on the usefulness of the bricolage
approach to study sustainable market linkages.
Theoretical framework
Depart from new institutional economics
Development interventions that encourage
cooperation to organize market linkages for small-
holders are, knowingly or unknowingly, often inspired
by theories in New Institutional Economics (NIE). NIE
can be regarded as a movement within the social
sciences that unites theoretical and empirical research
examining the role of institutions in shaping economic
activity (Coase, 2005; North, 1987; Williamson, 2000).
According to NIE institutions incentivize individuals
to maximize their economic behaviour in socially pre-
ferred directions and enact sanctions to punish those
who cheat or freeride on the collective action (William-
son, 2000). Following NIE, the organizations that mani-
fest in practice are the ones that are economically
most eﬃcient given their speciﬁc context.
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Building on this line of thinking development inter-
ventions speciﬁcally encourage cooperatives as
eﬃcient arrangements for farmers to access markets
(Shepherd, 2007; Holloway & Ehui, 2002). Cooperatives
are democratically controlled enterprises owned by a
group of people who voluntarily participate.
Members contribute ﬁnancially, and exercise control
through supervising the management. From a devel-
opment perspective the cooperative is attractive as
it responds to an ideology of bottom-up empower-
ment. The cooperative is owned, controlled and
ﬁnanced by its users, the farmers. Moreover, its
design is inclusive; anyone should be allowed to
become a member, and the governance and manage-
ment structure encourages participatory decision-
making (Bijman, Muradian, & Cechin, 2011).
The preference for the cooperative as an ideal col-
lective action arrangement stems from NIE’s idea that
rules and regulation, a clear authority and accountabil-
ity structure, and the use of penalties against free
riders are necessary for successful collective action
(Gardner, Ostrom, & Walker, 1990; Ostrom, 2000).
Moreover, NIE emphasizes the importance of transpar-
ency, clear conﬂict resolution, and resource allocation
mechanisms. The ‘cooperative’ principles ﬁt within this
logic. Cooperatives are regarded as arrangements that
can eﬃciently, and formally, coordinate transactions
for many smallholders in the ‘imperfect markets’ of
Sub-Saharan Africa (Shiferaw et al., 2011).
However, several critiques can be raised towards NIE
and the idea that sustainable market linkages are best
crafted by archetypical organizations. First, NIE holds a
de-contextualizednotionof organization. Organizations
induced by NIE inspired interventions are built on
generic principles concerned with internal group
factors. These interventions simply assume the coopera-
tive to be a suitable market arrangement in the context
of smallholders and imperfect markets, no matter the
speciﬁc characteristics of this market (Mehta, Leach, &
Scoones, 2001; Rodrik, 2014). In this paper, we aim to
unravel how even an archetype organization such as a
cooperative is co-shaped by its environment.
Second, NIE seems to equate institutional viability
with ﬁxed and formal structures that are rather static,
if farmers follow the procedures and statutes, the coop-
erative will provide themwith sustainable access to the
market (Rocheleau, 2001). In our case studies, we
observed that rural markets and the arrangements to
access markets are typically dynamic and membership
of marketing arrangements evolved over time (Benja-
minsen & Lund, 2002; Granovetter, 1985). Decisions
are often made by the use of implicit norms and
habits which may not conform to ‘modern’ managerial
concepts of transparent decision-making, but are
nevertheless eﬀective. Our aim is to study the processes
that lead to the viability of the case study cooperatives.
Third, the links between rules and decision-making
structures within institutions and the outcomes pro-
duced in terms of more eﬃciency are not as simplistic
as presented by NIE. Most local level organizations
have multiple purposes and an evolving organiz-
ational structure. Authority and the social norms for
resolving competition and conﬂict are rarely clear
and consistent but diverse and subject to negotiation
and compromise (Lund, 2001). In this paper we there-
fore pay close attention to the multiple purposes
cooperatives might have and to the internal nego-
tiation and decision processes.
Fourth, NIE maintains a very narrow conceptualiz-
ation of social capital; namely as an asset that fosters
cooperation. The fact that social capital is historical,
place-speciﬁc, can be exclusive, and can actually con-
strain successful collective action is neglected. NIE thin-
kers emphasize the importance of trust and social
connections, but are not able to explain satisfactorily
how these lead to performing collective action. In this
paper, we hope to come to an understanding of how
social relations in both case studies foster or limit the
performance of the cooperatives (Martin, 1993).
Fifth, NIE only has a partial understanding of
peoples’ motivations for collective action (Rocheleau,
2001). In real life, people have multiple roles and
aﬃnities, and their motivations for participating in
an organization might change over time. Moreover,
they make decisions based on both conscious and
unconscious rationalities (Douglas & Wind, 1987;
Giddens, 1984). In this paper, we aim to study how
cooperative membership touches upon diﬀerent live-
lihood ambitions of smallholders.
Our aim in this paper is to gain an understanding of
how cooperatives organize sustainable market access.
In a search for an approach that enables us to study
farmer organizations as evolving organizations in
dynamic and unique environments we propose to
use Lévi-Strauss’s (1967) concept of ‘institutional brico-
lage’, – shortly characterized as ‘making do with what-
ever is at hand’ – as described by Cleaver (2001).
According to this approach, institutions are shaped by
historical processes, the power relations which prevail
in social life and worldviews. They are constructed
both deliberately as well as in the practical iterations
of daily life. In the next section, we elaborate upon
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the approach andhowwe aim to use it. Institutional bri-
colage departs from NIE in that it regards institutional
formation as a socially embedded process rather than
a deliberate and transparent managerial activity.
Institutional bricolage
An institutional bricolage perspective is a critical insti-
tutionalist approach that refutes the idea that prevail-
ing institutions are an outcome of rational eﬃciency-
seeking behaviour. Instead, it regards existing insti-
tutions as a bricolage of borrowed, adapted and com-
bined institutions at hand in the processes of solving
resource management problems by collective action
(Cleaver, 2001, 2002; Cleaver & de Koning, 2015).
These modiﬁed and new arrangements always ﬁt
into what is locally perceived as an acceptable
manner of doing things (Cleaver, 2001; Galvan, 1997;
Lanzara, 1999; Sehring, 2009).
In this line of thinking institutions are not ﬁxed enti-
ties, but the results of what people do; institutions
must be continually reproduced or re-enacted by
people to exist (Lund, 2001). An institutional bricolage
perspective also challenges the notion of collective
beneﬁts: it assumes that power and inequality always
result in some people beneﬁtting more from outcomes
than others (Cleaver, 2005; Matose & Watts, 2010;
Ribot, Lund, & Treue, 2010). The bricolage approach
oﬀers an understanding of organizations as embedded
and evolving phenomena and aligns well with our aim
to grasp the development and functioning of two
cooperatives in two distinct contexts. It allows us to
view cooperatives, even when a-priori designed for a
speciﬁc purpose, as organizations that borrow and
adapt from other arrangements, such as church associ-
ations, women’s’ groups or savings clubs.
We follow Baker and Nelson (2005) in operationaliz-
ing the approach of bricolage. Baker and Nelson
(2005) conducted a review of research in which the
concept of bricolage was used to clarify a phenom-
enon observed. They identiﬁed a triplet of dimensions
coming back in all studies, helpful for our study:
Making do. making do implies a bias towards
action and active engagement with problems or
opportunities rather than reﬂecting over questions of
how to create an outcome given the situation at
hand. In their study to ﬁrms and bricolage, Baker and
Nelson (2005) observed an unwillingness to stick to
the conventional usage of practices, ideas and stan-
dards. The entrepreneurs insisted on trying out new
ways of doing this and left room for risk and failure.
Resources at hand. Using resources at hand is a
central theme in the diﬀerent studies reviewed by
Baker and Nelson (2005). It refers to both physical
assets, as well as skills or ideas that are easily available,
very cheaply or for free, rather than speciﬁcally acquired
to construct apre-designedproject (Lanzara, 1999).One
can think of the development of new ideologies based
on elements of existing myths and world views (Chao,
1999); or the construction of new laws from fragments
of existing ones (Hull, 1991). This also captures the
role of external resource constraints.
Combination of resources for new purposes.
Another central theme running through the studies
Baker and Nelson (2005) reviewed is the reuse and
recombination of above-mentioned resources for
diﬀerent applications than those for which they were
originally intended or used (see Cleaver 2002, 2005
for similar ﬁndings). In his case study on a community
association in Tukal, Senegal, Galvan (2007) shows
how seven young adults founded an association.
Their strong bond originates from the ritual of male
circumcision they underwent together in their youth.
However, the technocratic type of leadership they
applied derived from their working experiences in
Dakar. The only reason the local community legiti-
mized this type of leadership was because the seven
had also shown respect to the traditional norms and
values. Combining resources for new purposes deﬁes
assumptions of linear rationality; it is about recombin-
ing existing elements rather than fabricating them
from scratch (Baker & Nelson, 2005).
Using this framework, we trace the emergence and
functioning of two cooperatives which were successful
in establishing market linkages for their members in
Mali and Uganda. We do so using the following ques-
tions: First: How did the case study cooperatives ‘make
do’ with emerging problems or opportunities? Second:
what were the ‘resources at hand’ used by the coop-
eratives? And third: how did cooperatives ‘combine
these resources for new purposes’ to perform in a con-
tinuously altering environment?
Methods and research area
Methods
Our interest in cooperatives as arrangements to facili-
tate market access was triggered by our working
experience in development aid. We closely witnessed
the increasing attention in development policy and
practice to farmer organizations as means of achieving
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development objectives. In the ﬁeld we observed the
discrepancies between the theoretical assumptions
underlying the development interventions and the
practice and the diversity of well-functioning organiz-
ations at local level. We aimed to achieve an enhanced
understanding of the functioning of collective action
organizations engaged in agricultural marketing by
doing case study research.
Our paper follows a comparative case study design
based on qualitative research methods (Eisenhardt,
1989; Yin, 2017). A case study is an intensive, in-
depth study of a bounded phenomenon (Gerring,
2004). Case studies lend themselves to making cau-
tious causal inferences about the mechanisms of
inﬂuence on organizational development and per-
formance. We selected two cases of cooperatives
that were successful in trading: (1) cooperative
Nyetaa Waale trading in sesame in Mali, and (2) Alito
farmer group working in sunﬂower seeds in Uganda.
The cases diﬀer in terms of sector, location and the
actors involved. However, they lend themselves for
comparison as they both concern a group of people
that aimed to collectively succeed in trading food
crops produced for the regional market. Both organiz-
ations realized the tasks of procuring produce, orga-
nizing ﬁnance, transport, bulking and selling and
aimed to continue doing this, even when circum-
stances changed. The ﬁrst step in both case studies
involved the construction of a time path of key
events and critical moments in the development of
the cooperative. By means of literature research and
interviews with key-resource persons we traced how
historical processes in the local context had contribu-
ted to the emergence of the cooperatives. Interviews
helped us to understand how the organizations had
adapted to changing circumstances over time.
Next, we participated in cooperative meetings and
took part in activities related to the cooperatives’ tasks
to comprehend how the cooperatives functioned in
daily practice. We then used the concept of bricolage
to grasp how these organized sustainable market lin-
kages. For organizing and analysing the data we fol-
lowed the dimensions identiﬁed by Baker and
Nelson (2005): making do, resources at hand and a
combination of resources for new purposes.
Case studies
In northern Uganda, Kole, the Alito Joint Christian
Farmers Society2 (hereafter referred to as Alito)
engaged in the marketing of oilseeds (sunﬂower and
soy), as well as the production of crops for local food
security (maize and beans). Alito was established in
1998 and grew from 5 to 5500 members in 2015, clus-
tered into 161 farmer groups. The structure of the
organization was bottom-up; they were organized in
161 farmer groups led by a lead farmer who rep-
resented the group at the annual meetings. Alito
farmer group had several sub-committees: a pro-
duction committee responsible for ﬁnance and
administration; a marketing and processing commit-
tee for market information and bargaining with
buyers on behalf of the group; a disciplinary commit-
tee to settle grievances; and a maintenance commit-
tee responsible for transport and machine
operations. Any farmer could become a member of a
small farmer group, the group should however be
able to pay its annual contribution. The cooperative
covered eight districts and was registered as a coop-
erative society. The cooperative warehouse and
oﬃce were located in Kole district, northern Uganda,
30 kilometres from Lira town, the commercial hub
for Lango region. The northern part of Uganda had
seen a civil war from 1985 till 2005 between the
Lord Resistance Army (LRA) and the government.
The peace agreement in 2005, as well as changes in
the international market, triggered investments in
the oilseed sector (oilseeds form an essential part of
the diet in this area) by major processing companies,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the gov-
ernment. This led to an increase in production and a
stronger competition between traders for that
produce (Schoonhoven-Speijer & Heemskerk, 2014).
In Mali, Miena, Nyetaa Waale cooperative
engaged in the trading of sesame in Miena, Koutiala
district in South-East Mali. Koutiala is one of Mali’s
main cotton production areas. Cotton has been the
major source of revenue for farmers for decades. All
cotton producers are organized in cooperatives that
supply the Malian state company, CMDT (Compagnie
malienne pour le développement du textile, Malian
company for the development of textiles). However,
being dependent on cotton showed to have its draw-
backs. At the beginning of the 1990s, cotton prices
dropped dramatically and many farmers in the district
experienced problems supporting their households. In
2000, farmers in Miena responded to a call from the
crisis committee of the national farmers’ organization
SYCOV: by boycotting production they showed their
discontent with low cotton prices and the manage-
ment of CMDT. A drought occurred in the following
season and many farmers had to sell their equipment
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and oxen to cope with the crisis. In 2003-2004, farmers
took up cotton cultivation again but could not realize
its full potential due to a lack of equipment. Many
farmers could not repay loans they had taken out
with their associations and a large number ran into
debt. By 2006, many farmers in the district had aban-
doned cotton (Roy, 2010). To survive farmers started
to look to cash crops other than cotton. In view of
the increasing international demand, sesame oﬀered
an opportunity. A group of farmers in Miena organized
to engage in sesame trading, ﬁrst informally, and since
2010 formally as a cooperative. The cooperative had a
board with 15 members. Seven of the board members
had a speciﬁc function, such as secretary, cashier,
responsible oﬃcer for collection, responsible oﬃcer
for trading. Eight others were assigned delegate. The
board members all belonged to a diﬀerent cotton
cooperative and sourced sesame from this coopera-
tive. An ex-employee of the state cotton company
was the external advisor to the cooperative and
assisted with market linkages.
Findings
Alito farmer group in Uganda
Making do. Alito was founded in 1996 by 5 farmers (3
men, 2 women) as an informal farmer group. The chair-
man (who is still the chairman today) was a clergy in
church andmobilized the farmers. From the beginning
the group relied on his experience and expertise in
management. The farmers were motivated by the low
prices paid by traders buying their produce and
selling it in Lira town. They aimed to ‘by-pass’ these
intermediaries and receive better prices. In addition,
they intended to improve production practices.
From the start, the group received support from
the Ugandan Oilseeds Producers and Processors
Association (UOSPA). UOSPA was founded in 1995,
an association focusing on increasing oilseed pro-
duction, with both farmers and millers as members.
UOSPA contracted farmers for the multiplication of
an improved sunﬂower variety, and Alito was one of
the groups chosen for seed multiplication (Ton,
Opeero, & Vellema, 2010). UOSPA also assisted Alito
in marketing their sunﬂower seeds and provided
them with extension services.
Between 1998 and 2004, the group prepared to
oﬃcially register as a cooperative. UOSPA helped
them to elaborate a statute. The oﬃcial registration
as community-based organization (CBO) at both the
district and the national level in 2004 made the coop-
erative oﬃcially recognized and more visible to devel-
opment organizations. Indeed, the formal registration,
aswell as partneringwith awell-recognizedplayer such
as UOSPA, helped to gain trust from donors. NGO’s
started to engage Alito in their development interven-
tions.Making connectionswithNGOswas enhancedby
the end of the civil war in 2005, after whichmany NGOs
developed interventions for rebuilding the agricultural
sector in northern Uganda. Over the years, Alito
received assistance from at least seven NGOs, two gov-
ernmental organizations, three international donors
(such as FAO and the Worldbank), three seed compa-
nies, and one bank. Alito thus successfully engaged
with the opportunities available.
Overall, the group has done well and owned
several assets during the time of the research: one
main store, and eight other stores (one for each
cluster) are rented during harvesting time. The coop-
erative owned its own truck and rented extra transport
when necessary to collect the produce at the level of
the cluster. Alito also employed four extension
oﬃcers who provided technical advice and extension
services to cooperative members. Lastly, Alito had its
own motorized sunﬂower oil mill, with a capacity of
2 MT, which was granted by FAO in 2006 and
started operating in 2007. The installation of the mill
attracted more farmers to the cooperative, as it
enabled the cooperative to give farmers a slightly
higher price. Normally, they processed about one
third of the sunﬂower seeds themselves and sold the
rest to other millers in the area. Unfortunately, the
oil mill was not functioning during the time of
research, as some parts broke down. Spare parts
were very hard to ﬁnd, as the mill was already out-
dated when they received it (stemming from 1914)
and spare parts were to be imported from Kenya.
Making use of resources at hand. The coopera-
tive was initiated during the civil war period (1985-
2005). This context was of major inﬂuence on the
operation, functioning and ﬁnally the structure of
the group. To start with, due to the insecurities of
the war, it was diﬃcult to organize transport. In the
ﬁrst year after establishment the farmers sold their
produce to the same traders they were aiming to
by-pass. However, the traders were now oﬀering
them a better price because of the bulk they were
selling as a group. As a group they also had a better
position to negotiate. In addition, the founding
members started in Kole, a district that was relatively
little aﬀected by the war. People would take refuge
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here and started farming in the area. After the war
many of these farmers moved back to their own vil-
lages, taking home their knowledge and enthusiasm
for working cooperatively. This oﬀered Alito an easy
opportunity to expand to other districts.
Alito’s organizing structure was also opportunistic.
Being organized in small groups is an advantage for
the cooperative in terms of bulking; they can collect
from groups of on average 30 farmers, instead of
going from farmer to farmer. In addition, often
donor programmes from both NGOs and the govern-
ment required farmers to be organized in groups.
However, the capability of acting in response to
opportunities of individual farmers sometimes came
at the harm of the cooperative: several members
engaged in what is termed ‘side-selling’, marketing
oilseed destined to the cooperative to traders and
other buyers. There was competition for the sourcing
of raw material, especially for sunﬂower. Survey data
(own survey, 2015) showed that on average 75% of
the farmers sell their sunﬂower and soya output
seeds to Alito farmer groups. Two other main buyers
are a big processing company with its own outgrower
scheme (20%) and intermediary traders (15%). This
while the reported price for sunﬂower received at
cooperative was 7% higher. However, intermediaries
and the processing company oﬀered ready cash to
farmers, which farmers needed for pressing issues
such as school fees, or upcoming emergencies like
illness or funerals (See Milford, 2014 for similar
ﬁndings among coﬀee farmers in Chiapas, Mexico).
The cooperative’s oﬃcial rules against side-selling
were as follows: if it happened once, farmers were par-
doned and counselled by the clergy or other elderly
members of the cooperative. If the same person
side-sold for three seasons, he or she was expelled
from the group. The enforcement of these rules was
less straightforward. One the one hand members of
the management committee stressed the importance
of bulking enough produce. On the other hand, they
understood the need of farmers for ready cash,
which was something they could often not oﬀer: ‘we
allowed farmers to side-sell their produce, so that
they could use that money for domestic problems’.
Within the small farmer groups, farmers also hold
each other accountable as it proﬁts the group to be
reliable sellers to the cooperative. To solve the
problem of side-selling, the management stimulated
farmers to grow other crops next to sunﬂower and
soy, which they did not need to sell to the cooperative.
In this way, farmers could raise income or provide in
their own food during the period that the cooperative
was waiting for payment from selling crops. To this
end, the cooperatives not only distributed seeds on
credit to produce sunﬂower and soy, but also for
maize and beans. The costs of the seeds were dis-
tracted from the money a farmer received when
selling to the cooperative.
Combination of resources for new purposes. The
embodiment of using existing resources for new pur-
poses was the clergy who mobilized his church
network for trading purposes and was now chair of
the executive committee. He provided counselling
services for farmers who did not adhere to the rules.
This was a source of morality that generated trust
and commitment to leaders and each other
(Enzama, 2013).
Another example were the extra functions the
cooperative has been fulﬁlling over time. The main
goals of the cooperative were bulking oilseeds, over-
coming middlemen, and enhancing bargaining
power to acquire higher prices. Alito trained its
farmers to improve the productivity and quality of
their oilseeds. However, as the survey showed, an
important motivation for farmers to join the group
was ‘VSLA’: village savings and loans association. This
is a system where group members jointly saved
money, which was reimbursed at the end of the
year. During the year, members could borrow from
the group savings with a small interest, to use for
small emergencies.
Another example of this was a low interest rate
loan of the Ugandan Development Bank (UDB). The
cooperative received the loan for the ﬁrst time in
2014. An amount of 100,000 USD, of which 25% was
used for buying produce from farmers. Farmers
could apply to receive an amount of the remaining
75% and could use the money as they saw ﬁt. Some
invested it in farming, by renting or buying extra
land, or for farming inputs, but it was for instance
also used for the payment of school fees. The coopera-
tive was responsible for distributing the money and
reimbursing it to UDB. The cooperative management
estimated that the loan increased the number of
members; if individual farmers were to access a loan,
the interest rate would be much higher than when
receiving it from the cooperative.
Nyetaa Waale, Mali
Making do: Two people can be regarded as the foun-
ders of the sesame cooperative in Miena, Mali. The ﬁrst
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is an ex-ﬁeld oﬃcer, here called Adama, from the
state-owned cotton organization CMDT living in the
regional capital Koutiala. After Adama was laid-oﬀ in
2003 because of the reorganization of CMDT, he
engaged in trading. He identiﬁed sesame as a crop
with market opportunity. Due to increasing demand
by traders from India and China the neglected crop
attracted farmers to cultivate it on a larger scale.
Within four years Adama built a network of big
traders based in regional trading hubs and even in
Burkina Faso. These sometimes pre-ﬁnanced him to
procure sesame from farmers. To collect the sesame
at farmer level Adama used his contacts from his pre-
vious job at CMDT. He delivered planting material to
the secretaries of cotton cooperatives and asked
them to distribute it, and then collect the sesame pro-
duced. At the end of the season he picked it up.
However, often he was confronted with the fact that
the farmers had already sold his sesame.
The second founder of the cooperative is a farmer,
named Seydou, who was the secretary of a cotton
cooperative Adama was working within the munici-
pality of Miena. Adama already engaged in trading
sesame. In 2001 he sold his sesame on the market in
Koutiala. The trader buying his produce asked him to
procure sesame in the villages and pre-ﬁnanced him
on a weekly basis. As secretary of the cotton coopera-
tive, he contacted the secretaries of other coopera-
tives in the district and asked them to help him out.
He distributed money so they could collect the
sesame for him. They were remunerated with a per-
centage of the proﬁt. He aggregated all the sesame
at his house where the trader picked it up. At this
time the demand of the traders was still irregular,
they called him whenever they were approached by
traders or companies from India. Consequently, his
payments to the farmers were also irregular. For the
farmers money gained by sesame was a bonus,
cotton still formed their major income source.
In 2005, Adama met a woman who informed him
that there was a considerable number of sesame
farmers in the municipality of Miena. She brought
him into contact with Seydou. Together Adama and
Seydou decided to form an informal group to collect
and market sesame. This would provide Adama with
a stable supply and oﬀer farmers a guaranteed outlet.
In 2007 the group organized a district meeting in
collaboration with the mayor to increase membership
in their organization. Twenty-three of the 38 cotton
farmer cooperatives based in the district participated.
It was decided that all interested cotton cooperatives
would have a representative on the board of the
sesame association, either as a board member or as
a delegate. Under the supervision of the ex-ﬁeld
oﬃcer they divided roles and responsibilities. The ex-
ﬁeld oﬃcer was appointed in the role of external
advisor.
In 2008 the group concluded its ﬁrst contract with a
company that would buy 100 tons of sesame.
However, the company did not respect the contract
and the farmers were left with their sesame. The ex-
ﬁeld oﬃcer decided that in order to be able to ﬁght
such fraud it was necessary for the group to register
as a cooperative. In 2010 the association was ﬁnally
registered as a cooperative.
Resources at hand: Closer scrutiny of the function-
ing of the cooperative makes clear how the group of
farmers uses the resources at hand, thereby not
always taking law and prescriptions too strict. In
2001, the cooperative law was revised in line with
the principles of the International Labour Organiz-
ation. Under this new law, groups could not any
longer register as an association, only as cooperatives.
Within two years more than 7000 cotton cooperatives
were created. However, though the government
required farmers to organize in cooperatives and
operate according to the cooperative principles as
framed by the law and international conventions,
the shortfall in capacity to assist farmers created
room for manoeuvre at the local level. Davis (2000)
found that cooperatives in Mali rarely changed
board members, decision-making was seldom demo-
cratic, and ‘elite capture’ occurred more frequently
as the secretaries gained more and more power. This
local interpretation of the law is clearly reﬂected in
the functioning of our case study cooperative. As
explained by Adama: ‘The farmers had selected
board members who had never produced sesame.
People trusted them because they had leadership pos-
itions in the district.’ The inﬂuence of pre-existing
relations is also reﬂected in the fact that few sanctions
were in use, as one of the delegates formulated: ‘We
have all known each other for a long time, we are
brothers. If something happens, it can be discussed,
and the person won’t be expelled.’ From 2005 to
2011 cooperative members did not pay their yearly
contribution as was stipulated in the statutes. If
there were expenses, for example for the registration
as a cooperative, every board member would
contribute.
One of the rules of the cooperative was to buy from
farmers who were members of one of the cotton
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cooperatives represented on the board. Nevertheless,
oftentimes sesame was also bought from non-
members. The distinction between trading for the
cooperative and engaging in other trade relations
was blurred and the formal cooperative rules were
not always exercised.
The cotton cooperatives were engaged in shared
learning, input dissemination and bulking of cotton.
They had little experience in trading themselves. For
this the members of the sesame cooperative copied
expertise from local traders. Like local traders lacking
their own working capital, the ex-ﬁeld oﬃcer and pre-
sident looked for a big trader willing to pre-ﬁnance
procurement. After pre-ﬁnancing was arranged, the
president made several secretaries part of the board
to start collecting sesame within their cotton coopera-
tives. He sent them money. The board members thus
functioned like a network of collectors who, depend-
ing on their negotiation skills, gain an individual proﬁt.
Combination of resources for new purposes:
Why did the farmers trust Adama? And why did they
invite speciﬁcally the secretaries of cotton coopera-
tives to establish the cooperative? A side-step into
the history of the cotton sector in Mali shows how
the cotton cooperatives formed a sound base for the
sesame cooperative.
Since its establishment in 1974 the state cotton
organization CMDT forced- and facilitated- farmers
to be organized in groups. To facilitate eﬃcient
input dissemination, knowledge transfer and cotton
collection the cotton cooperatives are composed of
farmers that lived close to each other. Secretaries
played an important role in the management of
cotton cooperatives. To this day the secretaries bear
the responsibility for book-keeping and relation man-
agement with CMDT extension ﬁeld oﬃcers. The
established organization of cotton farmers thus lent
itself perfectly for the bulking of sesame and the
choice for a board composed of secretaries was a
logical foundation for the new association. Secretaries
were responsible to acquire information on the
planned production of each of their members and as
such were also easily informed about the availability
of sesame in their cooperatives. Secretaries knew
each other through meetings organized by CMDT.
This combination of knowing each other, being
informed, known by farmers and having management
experience, made the secretaries well positioned to
lead a sesame trading collective. In addition, the
relationship of the sesame cooperative with Adama
was similar to the relationship the cooperatives had
with CMDT ﬁeld oﬃcers. Without Adama it would
have been diﬃcult for the sesame farmers to access
external stakeholders. Moreover, he brought in knowl-
edge, inputs and cash. The established structure and
social relations in cotton organization thus facilitated
cooperation and were partly reproduced in the new
sesame cooperative.
The establishment of the group as a formal coop-
erative also fostered changes in functioning. Over
the years the relationship between the group and
Adama changed. After the registration of the coopera-
tive Adama established his NGO. Subsequently, he
was approached by donors to support and monitor
cooperatives that were part of their programmes. He
gradually took on a role as a technical assistant for
diﬀerent development programmes. In his new role,
he encouraged the cooperative to apply the rules
and principles as prescribed by the cooperative law
and gradually the organization absorbed new organiz-
ational practices. Participation in the development
programme, ‘improving sesame commercialization
for small scale farmers’, which the cooperative was
linked to by Adama required the application of rules
like transparent budgeting and joint decision-
making. The programme oﬀered opportunities like
access to trade fairs where they could meet other
traders.
Analysis and discussion
In order to enhance our understanding of how coop-
eratives organize sustainable market linkages we
traced the development and functioning in practice
of two cooperatives that were successful in trading.
In both cases existing relations and brokering
relations already present turned out to be of great
inﬂuence on the emergence of the case study coop-
eratives. In Uganda the church network formed the
basis for collaboration in oilseed trading. In Mali,
the foundation for cooperation was an ancient
cotton network. Both cases show that existing insti-
tutional arrangements, relations and ways of colla-
borating were re-used for new objectives; namely
trading oilseeds and trading sesame. In both cases,
a leader that had the capacity to mobilize and
guide farmers and who was able to facilitate linkages
with external stakeholders such as traders and
service providers, turned out to be essential. In
Uganda this role was fulﬁlled by the church leader,
in Mali this was realized by a collaboration
between a farmer leader and a ﬁeld oﬃcer.
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In addition to these existing (market) arrange-
ments, also several speciﬁc events encouraged the
emergence of the cooperatives. In Uganda the civil
war turned out to facilitate farmers to come together.
The end of the civil war caused a surge in NGO
support, as well as a broadening of the cooperative’s
network due to farmers returning to their homes. In
Mali a crisis in cotton and an increasing demand for
sesame encouraged farmers to shift to sesame and
search for new market linkages. It was however the
agency of the farmers to make use of the new oppor-
tunities oﬀered, that resulted in success.
Over time both organizations adapted to chan-
ging circumstances in order to be able to continue
realising their objective. In both cases, the regis-
tration of the organization as a formal cooperative
turned out to be important for acquiring access to
service providers and markets, both necessary for
succeeding in the objective of trading. Again, for suc-
cessful continuation members who were alert to
changes and emerging opportunities were key. All
achievements of both cooperatives were a result of
active problem-solving rather than following an a-
priori designed plan. The management of Alito coop-
erative was for instance pragmatic in eﬀectuating
rules concerning side-selling and compromised for
the sake of good relations with their farmers. In a
similar way, the UDB loan was used in a pragmatic
way. The UDB didn’t set strict requirements of how
to use the money, and the cooperative as well as
individual farmers were creative in how to use it. In
Mali similar practices took place; board members
gained a percentage of the sesame they collected
and the cooperative bought from members as well
non-members to fulﬁl its contract obligations. The
formal procedures and principles for cooperation
were secondary to pragmatism, in order to achieve
collective objectives.
Our observations correspond with the ﬁndings of
Porter and Lyon (2006) in Ghana, were researchers
identiﬁed a diversity of collective action arrange-
ments in one village. Eﬀectively this had nothing to
do with formality and transparency. Even temporal
organizations, such as cooperative labour groups
and community road-maintenance groups could be
successful in realizing their objective. The researchers
criticized donors that imposed formalization and
expected groups to exist for a substantial period as
stable entities. In Ghana’s traditional informal
group’s membership, focus, rules, and external alli-
ances shifted rapidly in response to changing
social, economic, and political conditions in a way
which was not anticipated by donors. De Weerdt
(2001) observed a similar dynamism and ﬂuidity in
collective action in Tanzania.
Using the concept of bricolage, we recognized that
both organizations were impactful because of their
ability to respond to changes and opportunities.
Success in trading was not achieved by following a
prescribed set of procedures or adopting an ideal
type of organization structure. It is therefore imposs-
ible to foresee where organizations will emerge and
in which form. The cases showed that the reactive
problem-solving and response to opportunities is of
more relevance to foster market linkages, then the
formal structure and procedure, often required or
imposed by external interventions.
Conclusion
We took a critical institutionalist perspective, an insti-
tutional bricolage approach, to understand how coop-
eratives become viable organizations to cater for
sustainable market relations. Institutional bricolage
departs from NIE in that it regards institutional for-
mation as a socially embedded process rather than a
deliberate and transparent managerial activity. To
analyse our objective, we studied the functioning
and development of two farmer cooperatives in
Uganda and Mali. Using a NIE lens, one could claim
the two cooperatives to be eﬃcient arrangements to
manage the transaction costs in their speciﬁc
context. However, our case studies showed that
there is more that explains their existence and viabi-
lity. The bricolage approach encouraged us to speciﬁ-
cally look at how the two organizations emerged,
interacted with, and developed in their speciﬁc
environment. This focus on emergence enabled us
to see that in both cases the socio-historic context
and speciﬁcally the organizational infrastructure exist-
ing turned out to be of great inﬂuence. A closer scru-
tiny of the internal operation of the cooperatives
taught us the importance of informal relations, auth-
ority, and ﬂexibility. Moreover, the bricolage approach
encouraged us to study the agricultural and market
environment allowing us to better understand the
speciﬁcities of each cooperative. The ability to strategi-
cally navigate in a context was of crucial importance to
successful collective action in both case studies.
Based on our ﬁndings we suggest development
policy and practice to include a critical institutionalist
approach when designing interventions aiming to
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enhance sustainable market access for small farmers.
We recommend shifting attention to the ability of a
cooperative to embed in a socio-historical shaped
local reality, rather than to comply to an ideal-type
organization, which is in line with recent research
on institutional diagnostics (Schouten, Vink, &
Vellema, 2018). Interestingly, both case studies also
shed light on the role of support delivered by
NGOs. Both cooperatives did not solely depend on
development programmes but did make strategically
use of services oﬀered. The objectives of the collec-
tive were leading in the way the cooperatives
engaged with these external services providers.
This teaches us that for NGO’s and development
practitioners it is important to well understand the
‘raison d’etre’ of the groups they intend to support.
We realize that our study also has limitations. We
took two successful cooperatives as a starting point
for the use of a bricolage approach, while it might
be interesting for further research to apply a bricolage
approach to the study of cooperatives functioning less
well. Scrutinizing the emergence and functioning of
such cooperative might shed interesting light on
why cooperatives are successful in certain situations
but less so in others.
By focusing on how cooperatives use both old and
new resources at hand to realize a collective objective,
we shifted focus from the structure and its eﬀects,
towards the functioning of an organization. We con-
clude that, in these cases, achieving sustainability is
not so much about putting the right institutions in
place, as it is about the capacity of an organization
to continuously navigate a certain context success-
fully, and make strategic use of both old and new
resources. Cooperatives can provide sustainable
access to markets only when they know how to
‘bricole’ i.e. when they are capable of forming and
altering the way they organize farmers in such a way
that they remain embedded within the local context,
and at the same time comply with the requirements
of an external market.
Notes
1. Brass (2007), for example, concludes that the failure of
agrarian cooperatives in the 1970s in Peru is a conse-
quence of the class distinctions within cooperatives. In
their study of farm supply and grain marketing Feng,
Friis, and Nilsson (2016) ﬁnd that the smaller the size of
membership, the more social capital cooperatives in
Sweden have. However, Totin et al. (2014) ﬁnd that the
larger and more diverse group of producers is best
organized. Another group factor of importance is accoun-
table leadership (Kaganzi et al., 2009). Mude (2007)
explains how corruption, political opportunism and mis-
management reduce eﬃciency of coﬀee cooperatives in
Kenya. Trust among group members is considered as the
basis for reciprocity and emergence of cooperative behav-
iour (Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; White & Runge, 1995).
However, contrary results are also found, Berdegue
(2002), for example, observed that close social relations
prevented members of cooperatives in Chile from enfor-
cing rules for fear of alienating friends and neighbors.
Totin et al. (2014) emphasize the importance of clear sanc-
tions. Cooperation should be economically feasible for
farmers to invest eﬀort and time (Mujawamariya,
D’Haese, & Speelman, 2013). So called ‘inadequate policies
and disabling regulation’ would undermine collective
action (Chirwa et al., 2005; Hussi, Murphy, Lindberg, &
Brenneman, 1993; Shiferaw, Obare, Muricho, & Silim,
2009; Stockbridge, Dorward, & Kydd, 2003). Lastly, staple
crops are thought to beof too little added value to be com-
mercialized through a farmer organization (Barham &
Chitemi, 2009). Local markets are assumed to be easily
accessible for individual farmers thus making group mar-
keting unfeasible (Narrod et al., 2009; Poulton, Dorward,
& Kydd, 2010). Thorp, Stewart, and Heyer (2005) ﬁnd that
poorer farmers are often excluded. Oftentimes coopera-
tives payment systems do not align with farmer’s needs
(Milford, 2014). Many studies refer to dissolution of
groups due to internal tensions or ceasing of subsidies
from donors. (Berdegue, 2002; Kasabov, 2016).
2. The group is called ‘joint Christian’ because the back-
grounds of the founding members were both protestant
and catholic. With ‘joint’ they want to demonstrate their
close community ties, despite diﬀerences in religion.
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